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I 
The Form of Evil 
The evil that is most intimate in our experience is the evil we 
ourselves do, active evil, not the passive evil we suffer. Of passive 
evils we know many. We undergo them in sickness, suffering, and 
death, in being the victims of the active evil of others, as when we 
are deceived, cheated, dealt with cruelly in body or spirit, or tyran-
nized over by the powerful. 
Again, it is personal evil that we know intimately, the evil you 
and I do, as compared with the more massive evil we do in our 
corporate existence, as when a race, sex, class, or caste oppresses its 
counterpart, or as when a powerful nation becomes involved in an 
ever-degenerating use of its power to impose its will on a weaker 
one-although there is no doubt that we bear personal responsibility 
for our share in these active social evils. 
For our present reflections, active personal evil is the most ap-
propriate. For this is the evil into which we enter from within our 
innermost being, and in which we manifest outwardly the truth of 
our own depravity. It is the form of evil we are best fitted to com-
prehend by experience and insight. 
Now personal active evil in its clearest form is moral evil. It is 
the evil done by an individual who freely violates his obligations, 
not merely his legal obligations but rather his moral obligations. 
To be sure, legal crime, such as robbery, violation of contract, rape, 
murder, or at the other extreme, the violation of a parking regula-
tion or highway speeding, embodies something like a transgression 
of morality. Murder violates what most of us would take, follow-
ing the commandment not to kill, as being itself a moral law; and 
further, every one of these crimes, just because it violates law itself, 
has within it, if not moral evil unqualified, nevertheless something 
akin to moral evil. 
Still, the law that is violated might be immoral, as in laws per-
mitting the exploitation of child labor or of racial distinctions, or it 
might be largely indifferent to morals, as in laws about parking or 
driving on one side of the streeL Crime consists in the violation of 
law as law, not of the law as either moral or immoral, and so it 
cannot be a purely moral violation. This means that the one who 
does it is being viewed, not as a genuinely particular person, but as 
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a mere legal personage, a generalized rather than a particular in-
dividual, whose character does not otherwise matter and is irrele-
vant to the fact of his committing or not committing the crime. 
From the law's viewpoint we are not criminals with our whole self; 
we could be pure as saints and still be guilty of parking in the 
wrong place, of violating a contract, and even (your imagination is 
called on to invent the circumstances) of rape or of murder. 
But philosophical reflection on essential evil cannot be satisfied 
with anything less than the evil that stems from the concrete person, 
the doing of which expresses the person's specifically moral will and 
effort. To such evil, common language gives names like vanity, 
enmity, malevolence, envy, ingratitude, disrespect, selfishness, glut-
tony, impiety, idolatry .... 
In these, the individual does something, to some degree know-
ingly and willingly, which he is in some degree convinced that he 
ought not to do. He knowingly and willingly does the opposite of 
what he is convinced he should do. When, for example, he is 
idolatrous, or ungrateful, or vain, he knowingly and willingly' wor-
ships where he understands he ought not to worship. refuses thanks 
where he knows that they are due, or gives his own self a prominence 
which he is convinced it really should not receive. 
In this moral sense, evil is the free violation of duty. It is free, 
first, in the sense that I know what I am doing and do it voluntarily. 
The act is my act, not merely imputed to me by others, but self-
imputed: I constitute myself the author of it. Secondly, it is free 
in the sense that the duty in the phenomenon is not merely an 
obligation imposed from the outside. I have to be convinced that the 
obligation is truly my obligation. The citizen who refuses to be 
drafted into the army to fight abroad, because his conscience tells 
him that war is morally wrong, whether war generally or some war 
in particular, violates what many others might consider his true 
obligation. But his own act, inward and outward, does not bear the 
mark of authentic evil: he is not violating what he is convinced is a 
duty, but quite the contrary, for he is convinced that resistance is 
itself precisely his duty. From his viewpoint his action is good, not 
evil. And when we comprehend his mentality, we understand this 
moral quality of his behavior, whether or not we agree with his 
specific conviction. He is freely violating what he sees as an unjust 
imposition rather than a genuine obligation. He is not knowingly 
and willingly doing the opposite of what he is convinced he ought 
not to do. 
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Violence committed by an individual belonging to an oppressed 
minority against members, property, and institutions of the domi-
nant majority offers an illustration of how intermixed good and evil 
become in real life. Although we can never rule out of the act of 
violence the possibility of some degree of actual malevolence, 
nevertheless the actor is able to view his act as a stroke for freedom 
against the evil of the oppressor. In the purest case, in which out of 
sheer desperation black men band together to defend themselves 
according to their best lights against oppression and to struggle for 
freedom by available means-and hence by violence when they are 
excluded from normal influence through a place in government-
their action has certainly for them and for much of their community 
the meaning of good. A white moralist might argue that blacks, in 
restricting their loyalty first to their own community rather than to 
the whole, are involved in a form of social evil. But the argument 
holds equally against those whites who hypocritically speak for all 
mankind while serving their own community. Hypocrisy itself is 
one of the arch forms of evil, and the black could reply that in 
fighting for his community he advances the cause of the whole of 
mankind as well. In any event, it is hard enough for any of us to 
escape hypocrisy, hard enough to be unambiguously good. 
A dearer case of opposing views of good and evil is that of the 
anti-social actions of ghetto gangs, criminal bands, outlaw families, 
who have their own loyalties, their own intrinsic codes of morality, 
who consider normal society and its population as enemies, just as 
one nation does another hostile nation. Here an act against the 
dominant society has the meaning of an act of heroism, of the local 
patriotism which counts on faith in the group and its values. Within 
the outlaw group one meets with what, in the larger world, goes by 
the name of virtue: helpfulness, sympathy, charity, devotion to the 
fulfillment of real bonds of obligation. And because the gang 
actualizes its attitude to the outer world through violation of that 
world's principles and by means that are often violent, this violence 
is also easily turned inward upon the errant gang member, who is 
treated less leniently sometimes than he would be in the larger 
world. The enforcement of interior morality is sanctioned by 
violence, too. 
In true moral evil the actor is convinced that the norm he 
violates is morally right. He is convinced that he is setting himself 
against what he ought to do, intentionally doing what he ought not 
to do. Evil cannot exist as active save in and through this active 
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opposition to what is perceived as good and right. If I see a child 
being brutally mistreated by a man and if I nevertheless consult my 
own safety and turn aside, there is already an evil quality of selfish 
cowardice in my behavior. If I positively encourage the brute then 
there is something more intensely evil in my behavior, a distinct 
malevolence involving a more active opposition to good. We com-
prehend evil more distinctly by meditating on the latter case than 
on the former. Active evil is free positive negation of what is per-
ceived as right and good. 
Note that evil has two major components: a) the violation, 
knowingly and willingly, of what is perceived as obligation, and b) 
the specific duty violated. The glutton violates the clear duty of 
resisting animal impulse and caring for his own bodily welfare. 
The selfish person violates the clear duty of treating others as ends 
and 'not as mere means. In each case there is the general formal 
factor to which the quality of evil primarily attaches itself. I am 
evil in treating another as a mere means to my own interest, not 
just because I have done him some particular harm, for then I 
should merely have damaged him in that particular way, but 
rather because, realizing that to treat him as a mere means is to 
violate the obligation of respecting him for what he is, I neverthe-
less do it. Evil is precisely this contradiction in will and action of 
what I am convinced is right and good. 
Clearly there is a real perversity in the structure of the evil will. 
I pit my will against what, simultaneously, I am convinced my will 
ought to be for. I repudiate what I acknowledge as obligatory, 
without ceasing to acknowledge it as such. My acknowledgment of 
the duty to care for my own health is not a merely theoretical recog-
nition; if it were, there would be less evil in my act of gluttony. 
What makes it evil is the fact that my will is involved. When I recog-
nize my obligation, I have a personal existential knowledge of my 
will's being bound to the good; I experience the obligation as a 
call upon my will; I hear it and feel it as an appeal and a demand, 
a pull, and indeed a rightful pull upon me; and nevertheless, I 
violate it. The ought has to be a real ought, not a merely ideal one. 
It is what my will, as a will, knows. 
Paul complained that he did not understand his own actions: 
For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing that I 
hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is 
good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which 
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dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells 
within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I 
cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I 
do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it 
is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. 
(Romans, 7.15ff) 
We see that Paul did not acknowledge himself here as evil, but 
placed the evil in the sin that dwelt within him, in his flesh. He 
himself, as he went on to say, had only good intentions in his mind; 
it was the alien element of sin within his body that worked evil: 
For I delight in the law o£ God, in my inmost self, but I see 
in my members another law at war with the law of my mind 
and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my 
members. 'o\l'retched man that I ami Who will deliver me 
from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus 
Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God 
with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin. 
(Romans, 7.22ff) 
We get the picture here not of an evil man acting malevolently 
but of a good man assailed by a maleficent principle that has 
lodged in that part of him, the body and its members, which is open 
to invasion. 
Had Paul been describing genuine evil, such as could belong to 
his own inmost self and not just to his flesh, he would have observed 
that, while he delights in God's law in his inmost self, that very 
same self is at war with itself, wants what it does not want, and 
does not want what it wants, and, in the struggle, wins out against 
itself in favor of the negative. He would have grasped himself as a 
genuinely ambivalent being, wanting to violate the very divine 
law in which he delights, contrary and perverse in his nature, 
proceeding to the perpetration of the violation from out of his 
intennost core.t 
Evil is like that childhood perversity, that infantile negativism, 
which says no to the parent just because the parent gives the com-
mand or wants the action. The child triumphantly dashes his cup 
on the floor, pitting his will against what he recognizes to be the 
authoritative will of the parent. He asserts himself. The beginnings 
of the possibility of evil are becoming visible, for the child already 
experiences the war of self with self, that inner self-tearing, in 
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which the nay-saying side finally wins out. But the child is still 
testing himself; the evil man, further advanced, enters into negation 
with the developed authority of his own self, understanding more 
fully the dimensions and implications of his action, and therefore 
more serious in his evil-doing. 
This perversity of will is the essential form of evil. The more 
explicitly I realize that I am acting against what I am convinced 
is the good-convinced in heart, soul, and will, not merely in intel-
lect-the more definitely and purely evil is my act. 
An important distinction within this context is that between 
formal and material evil. For there may be, first, an evil which 
exists mainly for its own sake as evil, not being specially concerned 
about the damage that is done to the victim or object. I can be evil 
in a pure disinterested way. I am concerned dominantly to realize 
my own potentiality for evil, as such. I want to oppose the good 
just because it is good, just in order to be evil. The victim is of 
secondary importance, a convenient necessity. It doesn't much 
matter to me whether I violate this duty or that, great or small, in 
regard to this person or that. It could be a lie told to this one, a 
cheating of that one, a betrayal of a third, a robbery of a fourth, 
torture of a fifth, and so on. Essential only is that it is I who am 
doing these deeds and, in each one, enacting my own being as 
opponent of good. With regard to the victim I maintain a psychical 
distance, disengaged from caring about him in particular (even if, 
at the same time, I know within myself the depth of true care). 
Such evil is formal. Although it always has some material con-
tent, its essential meaning is subjective rather than objective. The 
meaning is: the form of evil, the inward contrariety of will against 
itself finally conquering as the positive negation of good. It is like 
abstract painting which, if it makes use of representable objects, 
does so for the sake of establishing the visual form rather than for 
the sake of presenting the object. 
Evil is material, on the other hand, when done in connection 
with an emotion directed towards the object. Formal evil is in-
different to anything save its own practice of evil; material evil is 
not indifferent towards the victim. Emotions of enmity, hatred, 
resentment, malevolence, pitilessness, revenge, jealousy, envy, con-
tempt, feelings of Schadenfreude and sadism-such emotions, when 
directed towards someone, breed evil intentions and evil deeds. 
And here the evil is not disinterested but aims at doing harm. If 
I am jealous of someone who has exceeded my own achievements 
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and attained a greater fame, if I resent his good fortune and at the 
same time elevate my own worth above him so as, at the same time, 
to look down upon him with contempt-you will, of course, readily 
recognize the syndrome-it is easy for me to think of wronging him, 
although I clearly know and feel deeply the wrongness of what I 
propose. It is hard not to be evil here, for the self that is the agent 
of evil has been wounded and wants revenge. 
In formal evil, the act is pure wickedness; in material evil, 
malevolence gives color and body to wickedness. When malevolence 
becomes comprehensive, holding everything in its scope, it gains the 
universality of wickedness and adds to it the concreteness of its own 
object-directedness. And if, further, this generalized malevolence 
exists for its own sake, so that it is practiced not only out of antago-
nistic emotions towards its objects but also and essentially out of 
the positive will to be malevolent and in the self-enjoyment of 
malevolence, the peak of evil is reached. It is the kind of evil we 
personify in the Devil, the Enemy, Satan. Satan is the image of the 
unity of formal and material evil: material evil that has itself be-
come formal, and formal evil which includes within itself the whole 
character of material evil. He is the identity of the form and matter 
of evil. 
At its peak, evil breeds its own aesthetic. It experiences the 
beauty, the sublimity, and the novelty of the creation of the artist in 
evil. For the evil act can be so artfully wrought that everything in 
it fits in a perfect harmony of positive negation. It can be done 
on a great scale, so as to command awe in the face of the magnitude, 
depth, and power of spirit that perverts itself so utterly. And it 
can be done ever with an eye to something new, so that it might 
please through its sheer unexpectedness, or through the comic or 
grotesque shape it manifests. Only one who is hardened in evil is 
capable of such degrees of refinement. Novelty could even, in his 
case, include a sublime humor, in which the agent indulgently 
mocks himself, finding his outlet for evil in the self-destructive evil 
he does to himself, his evil expiring towards infinity in its own self-
annihilation. 
Fantasies of evil are made of this stuff. 
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II 
The Content of Evil 
If the form of evil is this inner perversity of will, what is its 
content? Language supposes that there is a genuine wrong in-
tended. We know, on the other hand, that from the Sophists down 
to the popular Freudianism and Existentialism of our day, setting 
oneself against the dictates of conscience has been celebrated as a 
liberation, a throwing off of conventional restraints imposed on the 
individual by the outside world, beginning with the parents and 
extending through the society. To some, the resort to what is 
customarily called evil is like the fight of an oppressed minority 
against an oppressing majority, an heroic struggle against a foe 
that has been planted within, the superego. If only the repressive 
force of the superego, or of the collectivity, can be overcome, man 
can emerge in his own individual freedom, liberated to be the pure 
natural being he was in the beginning. 
This picture of conscience as a repressive device, of human 
nature as originally innocent and good, of the pure assertion of the 
ego in its primal innocent nakedness, has a profund power of 
romantic attraction, as if, could we slough off civilization and the 
discontent that accompanies it, we could find our way back to the 
Eden of a pure beginning. But it omits the affirmative nature of 
obligation and of the complex concreteness of life which has to be 
built up in order for us to become human and live with one another 
in a common world according to our true nature as human. 
True community cannot come about through return to an 
imaginary innocent communal sharing in the polymorphous per-
verse, as my colleague Norman 0. Brown tends to believe, but only 
by the sharing-by persons who have passed over the threshold of 
suffering and keep the pain ever with them-of the complex of 
obligations, both duties and rights, required to make a genuinely 
free civilization. Freedom is eventual, not initial. It is reached, 
not by throwing off restraining bonds but by binding ourselves to 
keep together, by gathering ourselves into our mutual appropria-
tion, in a genuinely achieved communion. The true dignity of 
man is attained only by building forms of life which are held to-
gether by the ties which tie freedoms to one another, ties which 
moral agents undertake the responsibility of keeping, and incur the 
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guilt of violating. If this means that we must learn to control 
natural appetites and passions so that they are allowed their proper 
place in the economy of life, then that consequence has to be ac· 
cepted. It is part of man's finitude. For everything valuable we 
must pay a price. The question is only: Is what we get worth the 
price? Well-what is the price of humanity and human dignity? 
To set oneself intentionally against the bonds which free beings 
need in order to realize their freedom is to commit a wrong. The 
truly evil man is not he who, with little feeling for these bonds, 
does not have a strong conscience and thus has little to fight against, 
but he who is genuinely convinced of the obligatory nature of these 
bonds, yet who sets himself against them anyway. The former does 
what is bad because he is underdeveloped and ignorant of true 
sociality; the latter does what is evil because he consciously acts 
against sociality. The former does not comprehend real relation· 
ship; the latter is an avowed enemy of real relationship. 
As these observations imply, the answer to the question, ''What 
is the content of evil?,'' is, at first and in one word, Vanity. 
I mean by this, not ordinary vanity, like vanity about one's 
personal appearance or cleverness, but vanity of a more trans-
cendent sort. It claims for itself even a certain absoluteness. The 
evil person acts as though he were an absolute in very truth, a 
particular absolute, to be sure, because he has to recognize the 
existence of other finite beings, but, in his finite particularity, an 
absolute nevertheless. Evil is the work of the self, and when it does 
this work it has to absolutize itself. 
But I say "at first" because, while vanity represents the fore-
front of evil, its self-affirmative phase, it is evil's self-negating phase, 
covered over by vanity as a front, which is the essential content-
namely, the rejection of the seH's own truthful existence. 
As human beings we are subject to vanity because we are sub-
jects to whom there belongs freedom of choice, decision, and action 
as an essential quality. In order to have human meaning, my action 
must be not merely an automatic behavioral response but one that 
is mediated by thought and will. It is up to me to use or refrain 
from violence exerted on my neighbor. Automatic attack on him 
or flight from him does not yet have the meaning of genuinely 
human behavior; a rat or a cat does as well or better. If, then, I 
act violently towards him, by intention, my act embodies a specific-
ally human meaning; it externalizes that meaning in the actual 
world. 
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What is the meaning of such an act? 
To answer this question we have to understand the meaning of 
freedom, especially the moral freedom of choice, decision, and ac-
tion, for it is clear that the meaning of the act of human freedom 
must lie in the meaning of freedom itself. 
Our two basic words here, "freedom" and "liberty," carry two 
important aspects of the experience of freedom. The adjective 
"free" derives from Old English and associated Indoeuropean forms 
expressing love and peace, and all of these relate, presumably, to 
the assumed Indoeuropean root prai, meaning to protect, to spare, 
to save, to care for, to be fond of, to love. The Latin adjective 
"liber" means free, in the sense of one who acts according to his 
own will and pleasure, is his own master, is unrestricted and un-
restrained; and it is connected with the form "libido," pleasure, 
desire, eagerness, longing, fancy, inclination. But it is probably 
related also to words in Old German and affiliated languages mean-
ing people, as in the German Leute, as well as words meaning to 
belong to the people, to be free in the sense of being among the 
people to whom one belongs or to be one among a free people. 
Also associated are the Greek eleutheros, to be free, noble, and 
words referring to growth and to aftergrowth, the offspring genera-
tion. There are further connections as well, but these are enough to 
indicate the main outline of the area in which our languages have 
conceived the notion of freedom and formulated the experience of 
the peoples who speak them.2 
What is the content of tbis experience? To be free is to be able 
to act according to my own will and pleasure, to be my own master, 
unrestrained and unrestricted. But it is more than that, for I 
cannot have this freedom unless I am with my own people, who 
will hold me in peace, protect me, save and care for me, and in the 
deepest sense, love me, and towards whom I behave in a reciprocal 
way. Moreover, they themselves have to be a free people, living as 
its own master, unrestricted, a noble people not an enslaved one. 
Such a people maintains its freedom in the historical continuity of 
the generations it produces, who belong to it and carry forward 
its destined task of providing the human world in which the new 
individual can grow up in peace and love, cberished, nurtured, 
protected, given the opportunity to be himself, and in his tum 
loving, cherishing, nurturing, protecting, and preserving the heri-
tage of freedom for the generations that follow. 
This is the basic experience of freedom which our language-
12 
that is to say, our ancestry who kept to the speaking of it-has 
preserved for us to gather from it the necessary wisdom. 
We can see the content of this experience if we reflect that to be 
with one's people, in the world of that people, while at the same time 
able to act according to one's will without restraint, is to be, in the 
very act of being with other human beings, precisely with one's own. 
There is a unity, even an identity, between one's own individual 
will and the communal will belonging to the people as such. What 
the community wills is what the individual wills and what he wills 
is what the community wills: they are in an accord of will: and 
this is what it means for the individual to be with a people as his 
own people and as one who is their own. Individual and com-
munity are own to one another, not in a foreshortened way, as 
when the individual is tyrannized over, terrorized by the com-
munity, or the individual is tyrant and terrorizer of the community, 
but in the fullest sense of ownness possible between an individual 
and his people, where the relationship is based on mutual trust, 
loyalty, care, and love. 
This ownness-relationship between individual and community 
is the content of civic virtues, of genuine patriotism, citizenship, 
and participation in public life, and it supports the possibility of 
development of individuals who can freely share in the arts, re-
ligion, and thought of the culture, living by its wisdom. It is be-
cause the ownness-relationship between individual and community 
has grown significantly weaker in our country that, by a necessary 
consequence, the civic virtues have become more and more obscured, 
to the point at which, in certain circles, citizenship is taken as a 
joke. 
Ownness, having as one's own and being own to, is the funda-
mental content of all human relationships as such. The expres-
sion "ownness" could be described (following the analogous usage 
of Russell in regard to logical constants) as a "systematically am-
biguous" word. It means different things in different contexts, and 
yet there is a continuity that extends throughout the differences. 
In Hegelian language it would be called a "concrete universal" 
since, in order to develop its full meaning, it needs to unfold in a 
manifold differentiation which nevertheless constitutes an identity. 
In man, this process of differentiative unity shows itself in the 
most articulate manner. Freedom is ownness, and if one of the 
several meanings of freedom, as in the Latin "liber," is desire and 
eagerness, we could even say that man is the desire and eagerness 
that constitutes freedom. 
The fundamental drive of human life is the drive of ownness: 
to be with what is other and alien as not being alien but as own. 
Every relationship which man tries to establish with what is other 
than himself is one in which he tries to establish a form of own-
ness. The attempt is not always pretty: an act of cruelty exercised 
on a victim is also an attempt to establish one's power over the 
victim and thereby to identify the victim as one's own possession, 
impressing on him the mark of one's own domination. Ownness 
is the substance of love but, just because it is that, it is also the 
substance of hate; it is susceptible of the most deformed and per-
verted violations of the spirit of love, because it is love; and part 
of the tragic meaning of life is that the negative as well as the 
positive aspects of ownness demand articulation. 
Hunger is the need to appropriate a part of the external world 
to make into one's own body and to use its energy for one's own. 
Sexuality in its primary biological sense is the need to enact the 
reproduction of one's kind, one's own breed. The master-slave 
relationship, as Hegel describes it in the Phenomenology of Mind, 
develops out of the battle between two egos for recognition and 
acknowledgment: the one becomes the owner, the other the owned, 
the one the master and lord, the other the slave and bondsman. The 
slave owns-that is, acknowledges-his belonging to the master, not 
only in word but also in deed; the master owns him almost as he 
owns a thing. Legal property is an ownness-relationship between 
a legal person and a thing: the society acknowledges his right to 
the thing's possession and disposition, and it imposes on others 
the obligation of refraining from taking possession of the thing 
without due process. Psychologically. the legal ownness-relation-
ship of property becomes a spiritual relationship in which the 
owner experiences, in his property, his own being extended beyond 
himself. He calls it "mine" as if his ego stretched beyond his skin 
and over the acres of his estate, the bodies of his automobiles, the 
shine of his silver service. 
Beyond the legal relationship of owner and non-owner of prop-
erty there are more intimate relationships of ownness among 
humans, as for instance those involved in the family. The children 
are the parents', the parents are the children's. It is my brother to 
whom I am brother or sister. We are all together one another's. 
But we belong to one another, not as things belong to property 
14 
owners (although sometimes, as in Rome, the relationship could ap-
proach this condition), but as one human being can belong to an-
other-by mutual participation in a communal life-relationship. So 
too in a wider sphere our life is part of the life of a village, a 
nation-state, eventually of the human world and the history of 
that world. The manner of our participation in these determines 
the content of the ownness-relationship of individual to community. 
Nations themselves relate to others on the international level ac-
cording to their own modes of ownness, in law and culture, war 
and peace, in trade, in the complexity of the whole world-historical 
process. 
And beyond the structures of worldly ownness there are those 
that belong more purely to the human spirit as such, its expression 
and communication with transcendent reality in art, religion, and 
thought. a 
At all levels of his life man seeks freedom, that is to say, seeks to 
be with other as with own. Sometimes the effort damages, or even 
destroys, the other, as in eating, rape, robbery, slavery. Sometimes 
the effort damages or destroys one's own life, as in self-sacrificial 
devotion and struggle for a cause. And there are fonns of deviation 
in which, as in masochism, one seeks to rape the other into cruelty 
towards oneself, or as in a truly erotic sadism one seeks to embrace 
the other in love by means of the violent act. Then there is the 
partitive form of social ownness, as in racism, where one community 
closes into itself in a tight ownness and purposely excludes another 
community as alien, not-own: the alien community becomes the 
first community's own not-own, needed as a scapegoat or an object 
for hostility-behavior, in which oppression and the infliction of 
hann become relevant ways of imprinting the one's own mark on 
the other. The in-community's inner ownness is heightened by its 
identification of the out-community's otherness. The phenomenon 
of the external threat used to build up a nation's solidarity and 
war-willingness is a similar phenomenon of partitive ownness. 
The higher the mode of ownness we practice, the higher we are 
able to raise our practice of the lower stages. But also the perver-
sion of a higher mode perverts the lower. Thus the sexual relation-
ship can exhibit higher and lower fonns of ownness. The freedom 
achieved by the rapist is of a low order, comparable to the master-
slave relationship; and it is perverted because he treats the raped as 
a virtual thing, an object, a person who is a non-person. In genu-
inely communal love, the persons do not use one another merely 
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as love objects, to be thrown off aftenvards, but share a meaningful 
experience of fulfillment. 
We may note here that to have the most fulfilled and freest 
sexual relationship the partners must not be selfish. That is not 
to say that their selves must not be enhanced in it; quite the con-
trary, since communion always enhances the self. It means, rather, 
that they must not use one another as mere means to their own 
pleasure. Each has to acknowledge and fulfill obligations towards 
the other, not in a legal or formal way, but in the very sensitivity 
and tenderness of the relationship. Each has to acknowledge and 
undergo a bond on his or her abstract freedom, which othenvise 
would merely consult its own pleasure. True love is a concrete 
freedom. Here already, in the very core of the erotic experience, 
genuine morality begins to appear as necessary for the existence of 
the concrete freedom that forms the truth of the experience. 
It is our fundamental instinct to seek freedom in its more and 
more concrete shapes. This freedom is found in ever-growing full-
ness in the articulation of the ownness-relationship, with things in 
the world, with our fellow humans, with the world as a whole, and 
with the transcendent and divine. The more we grasp freedom as 
ownness, the more we understand that the fullness of it lies, not in 
the mastery of the self over others, not in the possession by the self 
of things, not in victory, property, war, wealth, fame, power, but in 
what raises up and transfigures the force in these lower and more 
onesided forms to forms in which there is mutuality and reciprocity, 
equal to equal, in all the difference. The truest owness of sexuality 
is the kind partnership of love. The truest ownness of feeding is 
the sacredness of communion. The most important logical cate-
gory for philosophical thinking about freedom is the category, not 
of substance, nor of cause and effect, but of reciprocity which, in 
its higher levels, is community and communion of real individuals. 
With this brief sketch at hand of ownness as the content of 
freedom, we can now return to the question of the meaning of the 
vanity that constitutes evil. And we shall find, if we examine the 
vanity of evil from this standpoint, that it is itself a perverted 
form of ownness and freedom. 
This vanity of evil belongs to the moral sphere. In the realm of 
morality, the moral judgment of right and wrong is left up to the 
individual, with his particular will. That is the essential meaning 
of morality. Whereas in law the determination of right and wrong 
is made by the legal authority-legislature, court, judge-and 
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whereas in communal forms of existence, such as the family, village, 
and nation, judgments of right and wrong are made by the com-
munity, in morals the individual himself is forced to decide whether 
a proposed action is right or wrong. The law may try to exercise 
its sanction upon him, and the various communities may try to do 
the same from their viewpoints, but in the end the individual has 
to take it on himself to make a decision, within his own breast, 
and to dare the action on which he decides. In the language of 
Protestantism he has to appeal to his conscience, the divine voice 
within him; in the language of the Enlightenment, he has to con-
sult his reason; and there are other languages which men have used 
to describe the process. 'What is essential for our reflections, how-
ever, is that the individual is the final court o£ appeal, the ultimate 
yea- or nay-sayer, and therefore has ultimate responsibility which, if 
the judgment errs, becomes ultimate guilt. 
In the moral sphere the individual subject is thrown on his 
own. In the positive sense, if he is a moral individual, he knowingly 
and willingly sets himself to do what in his conviction is right and 
good. He may be fearfully misled in other respects and his acts 
may turn out to harm his and others' welfare; but the specifically 
moral quality of his act depends on his knowing and willing per-
formance in this rarefied sphere of individual judgment and de-
cision. It is the self which is here of the essence. 
Nevertheless, the moral man subjects this essential individuality 
to the authority of what he is convinced is right. He recognizes 
obligation as binding on his individual freedom. He is not com-
pelled by anything outside-whether in the legal or the communal 
world-to perform his action. The force that determines the per-
formance is the force of his own self. Yet he lets the self be bound 
by right. He acknowledges the rights of others to be the foundation 
of obligations towards them (or towards himself as other), and he 
lets himself be bound by these obligations. Through this knowing 
willingness, he articulates the specific form of union-of reciprocal 
ownness-characteristic of the moral sphere. 
Ownness in the moral sphere is the reciprocal belonging of sub-
jects to subjects by way of their free acknowledgment and realiza-
tion of the oughts-the rights and obligations-needed to constitute 
their intersubjective freedom. The Kantian image of a kingdom of 
ends and developments out of it, like Buber's dialogical relation-
ship, have helped to establish this conception of morality for the 
modern mind. 
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The moral man acts essentially as an individual, yet his action 
is the farthest thing from vanity. His self is the ultimate agent, but 
there is nothing selfish in what he does. Retaining his individuality, 
he transfigures it into identity with other individuality in moral 
community, this particular mode of the lonely binding of self with 
selves. By moral action a kind of mutual ownness or appropriation 
is opened up which is free, reciprocal, and constrained only by the 
infinitely fragile bond of free decision. By this bond we give our-
selves as own to one another and grant ourselves a free community 
of own with own. Binding ourselves in freedom, we for the first 
time realize our freedom objectively in a world, not of natural 
things alone, but of selves: we make an objective spiritual com-
munity in which we share subjective freedom together. 
Moral evil intentionally directs itself against this freedom-com-
munity. Suppose, out of envy, I permit myself to spread malicious 
gossip about my rival. The gossip may be true and that could make 
it all the more harmful to him. Already in this act of material evil 
I have negated a possibility of moral community. I decide against 
accepting one of the bonds of connection which constitute an 
objective moral world, withdraw from that world, alienate myself, 
practice as an enemy against it. I had allowed envy to obtain an 
influence on me, but I could even grow bolder and engage in a 
more resolute attack on moral community, searching for loopholes 
in its defenses where I might place mines of malevolence. 
Like the moral man, I too act essentially as individual, but in 
the opposite direction. It is precisely I upon whom the responsi-
bility lies to become one with the moral community or to estrange 
myself from it as an enemy. Unless I had this choice there could 
be no such thing as morality. If, then, I choose against moral 
community, it is I alone who have set myself against it, The content 
of my action is-1. It says-not we, but I. Not I with thee in a 
union of ownness, but I against thee, simply and solely as I in and 
with myself. I as essence. Vanity. 
Since every one of us is evil in some way, every one of us knows 
the exaltation that comes when the self raises itself above com-
munity, confident in the strength of its own freedom. The action 
it performs is all its own, and the reverberations through the world, 
as the victim suffers, and beyond, also are its own-the wave that 
the evil self has started spreads from it as the center. The ego sees 
its motion expand through the world, carrying with it the meaning 
"mine, all my own." And it is proud. It has in this degree shaped 
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the world. If it could, it would like to see its power of impressing 
its own being on the world increase until nowhere could there be 
resistance to it. Nothing intrinsic to the vanity of evil sets a bound 
to its desire. As this singular particular ego, it wishes to be an 
absolute. 
Now in the pursuit of its vanity the evil ego is seeking ownness, 
too. It is not as though it has set itself against ownness; that is im-
possible for an ego, since the very meaning of "I" is given only in 
terms of "mine." It is a question, rather, of the content of the 
"mine." 
Vanity's mineness is the spread of the ego's solitary dominance 
over the resistance of the nonego. As vain, I seek to make every 
other into mine alone, thrusting down its own claim to its own. 
I seek to treat everything else in the way in which he who seeks to 
master another as slave wishes from him the acknowledgement that 
the master alone is the essential I and the slave's I is nothing but the 
master's. 
Vanity seeks only the recognition of itself in its particular in-
dividuality as, nevertheless, counting for the selfhood of every-
thing. It seeks to substitute its own individuality for the universal 
being of all selves. It treats others as mere means to the inflation 
of the I. Thus it seeks to substitute for the reciprocal ownness of 
moral community the nonreciprocal onesided ownness by which 
everyone and everything would confess to being the I's own, im-
mediately and simply. It would like to govern the other as its own 
dependent rather than be with the other as own to own in equal 
reciprocity, that is, in the fraternity of moral community. 
Evil is not revolt against ownness. It is the fight for a onesided 
ownness, as in the political sphere the aspiring tyrant fights to 
become the lord of the world. 
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III 
The Doing of Evil 
How is it that man wills evil? 
Does he have a motive towards it, does he seek a gain through 
it? Must we not answer, yes, there is a motive and a gain, the same 
as in everything human: to attain to a condition of positive con-
crete freedom, of being with other as with own? 
The dialectic of evil causes it to reject the other selves as own 
in a reciprocal moral way in order to make them own in the empty 
way of a onesided appropriation. Evil cannot accept the other as a 
moral brother. To accept him as own it has to transform him into 
a thinglike being. It exacts the sacrifice of the other's selfhood to 
its own need for the other to be its own. The untruth of evil is 
visible in this, that it takes the wrong thing to be the solution to its 
problem of ownness. Where the truth would lie in fraternity, it 
takes vanity to be true. But it does so because, by vanity, it can 
transform everything into its own, even if only by making it empty. 
Evil genuinely seeks freedom, but only the wrong condition of 
freedom. 
Is this due to ignorance? 1£ it were, would not evil lack some-
thing of evil? He who acts against the good not realizing that it is 
the good he acts against, is not evil. 1£ the evil man saw only the 
realization of self as good and actually saw no wrong in his refusal 
of other selves, how could he rightly be called evil? 
Evil, then, knows what it rejects. It knows the value and truth 
of the moral fraternity that constitutes the community of free obliga-
tion, and it nevertheless acts against it. Does it do so because it 
wishes to avoid the sacrifice of self entailed in being good? For one 
does have to surrender vanity and the vain possession of the world 
in order to enter into the kingdom of ends. But would not the truly 
evil self know that, in refusing to surrender vanity, it has sacrificed 
even more-the substance, dignity, truth, and worth that belong to 
moral fraternity? 
How is it then that the evil self enters into evil and persists in 
being evil? Could we not say: just because it is proud and vain, 
because it fancies itself in its absoluteness? But is that an answer 
or is it not rather the question all over again? 
The ego is indispensable. Without it ownness cannot exist in its 
20 
truth. The ego is the principle of ownness, for it is the ego's voca· 
tion to say: "That is mine and I am its own; we belong to one an-
other." Only the ego, saying "mine," can go on to say "we" and 
"our." But for the ego to be able to say "mine, our," it must first 
be able to say: "not mine, not our, not thine." In its mere im-
mediateness, the ego has only the power of saying: "I am mine." 
It must be able to turn outwards, finding there what is not its own, 
so as to be able to find the way to ownness beyond itself. It must 
say: "Thou art not mine, I am not thine," before it can arrive at 
the point of confessing: "I would be thine, pray be thou mine." 
The ego must be free. That is the condition for the power to say 
no. In principle, while it can invest in its other, the ego can by the 
same token withdraw itself from any role it might assume towards 
the other. This is its radical freedom, which Hegel called its 
abstract freedom, and which, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre made 
over into a pure egoless, though not therefore selfless, freedom. In 
its abstraction the ego can achieve a certain absoluteness. If it pulls 
back from its investment in the external world, it has wrested itself 
free to be its own universal. The ego, as such, is a universal. It is 
present in every role it assumes yet is exhausted by no aggregate 
of them, but always capable of retracting itself into itself, to hover 
above them in its purity as the free potentiality of them all. At the 
same time it is a particular universal. You and I are situated 
differently, thrown into the world differently, with different bodies 
and capacities, while yet each of us exists as a pure universal free-
dom. Each is a limited unlimited, a special general, a finite infinite. 
In virtue of this universality of our freedom, it becomes possible 
for each of us to exist solely in and with our self, even in the midst 
of the world. This we do by hovering in freedom above all possi-
bilities, by an ontological irony. It is like the teaching of the Stoics 
or the Skeptics or the Sophistical Relativists: we view everything 
in thought solely in its relation to us, as not us, and hence as all 
our own in this very negativity; we are superior, high-Hying; all is 
below us, subdued by our flight above and beyond it. 
Just because it can say no to all, retract itself into itself, hover 
above all being, the ego can thus also become the lord of the 
world-in a cheap and wholesale way. I am the emperor in the room 
of my little ego. The window looks out on the world; the world is 
all pictured there; my walls keep me safe. There is even a certain 
infinite, though finite, satisfaction in sitting upon this throne. 
This universal power of egoity is necessary. You cannot give 
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yourself to another unless you have the power of refusing yourself. 
He who tells the truth without realizing that he can lie, is naive, as 
innocent as child or beast. He who tells the truth, overcoming the 
temptation to lie, is good, because he has been sophisticated by the 
temptation and has suffered the pain of conquering it. The ego 
exists, not to be thrust down, but to become mature and strong, 
beyond innocence first, and then beyond evil. Egoity has to be 
defended against threats, maintained in strength, made athletic. By 
the nature of man it grows into a power that needs and demands 
its preservation. Some religions, like Tibetan Buddhism, practice 
the overcoming of egohood, selfhood, as an illusion that keeps us 
embroiled in the realm of suffering, sickness, and death, of evil 
undergone as well as done. But the practice does not result in a 
mere erasure of selfhood; it leads rather to an A ufhebung, a de-
struction which is at once a preservation and exaltation, a trans-
figuring which raises selfhood to a new height of power and truth-
easily recognizable in the religious practitioner himself, who mani-
fests his new-found powers over the world as well as over his self! 
It is in this very element of the strength of the good, the power of 
the self to give or refuse itself, that the power of evil roots. The 
power to give and accept must also be the power to refuse and 
reject. It is the same power, not two different powers; it is an 
identity of opposite modes of action. The power by which I tell 
the truth or by which I recognize the right of a black man to full 
participation in the social world is the identical power by which I 
lie or refuse the recognition of his right. And this power cannot be 
a mere static possibility, not even a dynamic potentiality; it has to 
be the nature of free impulse, something genuinely daemonic. I 
have to resist the lie or the human refusal. 
How is it that I do not resist? 
I must not put myself off, or try to salve my conscience, by soften-
ing the answer. I could say: although I know in a certain way 
the fundamental truth and dignity of the good, the meaning of life 
as a full member of the moral community, nevertheless I do not 
fully realize this knowledge. It is not present and urgent to me as 
is the knowledge of the satisfaction vanity gives me. That would 
be to say that my error is due to a certain degree of ignorance, and 
it would tend to excuse me, if only a little. It would make the evil 
something slightly less than evil. And that is not enough for an 
answer. 
Nor can the quality of evil be obscured by pleading the power 
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of temptation or weakness of will, rather than weakness of intelli-
gence. For here too the evil would be lessened, made not quite evil, 
and our real question passed over. 
The ego is its own temptation: the power of giving is the 
temptation to refuse. The will negates itself. Freedom contradicts 
its own self. Ownness turns against itself. At the point of doing 
evil, the power of giving becomes fascinated by itself as the power 
of refusing. The power of respecting becomes fascinated by itself 
as the power of contemning. Affirmation becomes fascinated by 
itself as negation. I give-a refusal; I affirm-a negative; I turn my 
respect around to its other side. The fascination is active, not pas-
sive. Freedom fascinates itself, intentionally, willingly. 
There is not, as Paul thought, an exterior force that comes in 
here to make me its captive. I capture myself, make myself slave, 
so that I may become master of all. 
Is this irrational? Of course it is, if reason is the power of find-
ing in my relationship with other a reciprocal ownnessl Does reason 
bid me to avoid evil? Of course it does, since it opens to my view the 
truth of the reciprocity of ownness in moral community. Do I 
listen to reason? Of course I do-l hear her every word and calli 
Do I commit the evil deed? ... It is I myself, full of rationality, 
comprehending to the full the substance of moral truth, hearing 
with clarity the call of reason's voice, this I, the very model of 
freedom, affirmation, and truth, who fascinate myself into the 
practice of my little absolute vanity, who let myself play the role 
of the hovering lord of the world. 
And do not trace it to the animal in me, to some ancient aggres-
siveness which I have inherited from the animal kingdom along with 
the rest of my flesh. The animal is not vain. I use aggressiveness 
in my vanity. I am no mere animal, but I, ego, self, the power of 
freedom and bondage, of affirmation and negation, of giving and 
refusing. Aggression I can handle, hostility I can turn to good, 
just because it is I who am presently in action. 
To be sure, the source of the possibility o£ my being evil is my 
finiteness. If I were not an I, alongside a you, open then to the 
possibilities of giving and refusing, offering reciprocal ownness or 
taking a onesided possession, there would be no possibility of evil. 
A single being, all in all, like a Spinozistic substance, could not be 
evil. 
But this is not an explanation of evil; it does not explain how 
I perform the evil act. It gives only a necessary condition of the 
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possibility of evil-namely, that there should be the split between 
one and another, so that there should be the possibility of the re-
fusal of a reciprocal ownness. 
Evil is not to be explained so much as it is to be recognized. 
The ego is the identical power of good and evil, as a power equally 
good and equally evil, since the equality here is a sameness. 
We can cover up the practice of evil, explicitly by hypocrisy, less 
explicitly by the convenience of a bad faith. These acts are them-
selves evil and, indeed, part of the business of practicing evil, since 
it would become too uncomfortable for us to recognize ourselves 
without our dress in the pure nakedness of our vanity. 
There is no need to offer advice or to preach. 
Notes 
I. These remarks on Paul should be taken in their limited sphere. I recog· 
nize that there are other passages in Romans in which Paul assigns the responsi· 
bility for evil to the self, not merely to an invading power of sin. For instance: 
"Though they know God's decree that those who do such things deserve to die, 
they not only do them but approve those who practice them." Nevertheless the 
passage cited above is clear m its own construction; the image it paints is not 
that of an evil man but of a man beset by the enemy. 
2. Reference to any of the standard etymological dictionaries will provide a 
fuller and more particularized account of this context of meaning. See, for 
instance, Eric Partridge, Origins, A Sl1ort Etymological Dictionary of Modem 
English, New York: Macmillan, 1959 (2nd edition), articles "free," "liberal," 
and similarly dictionaries for other Indoeuropean languages, all of which are 
important in this context because these were the peoples-Greeks, Romans, 
Europeans-whose historical experience has been one long·continued struggle 
towards freedom. I have not investigated the question in non·European 
languages. 
ll. You will recognize the closeness of this descriP.tion of levels of ownness 
to the structure of the Hegelian philosophy of mind. fhat is because, more than 
any other thinker, Hegel recogn1zed the significance of the ownness·relationship 
(in terms of his own concepts of identity, unity, reconciliation, etc.) as the 
basic form belonging to life and spirit and did what no one else was capable of 
doing, showed how the same fundamental idea had to take these varied forms 
in order to develop its own content. There is much truth that we have to wrest 
from Hegel's vision, e\'en if we should radically transform it (as has happened 
in Marx, Sartre, Heidegger, Dewey, and others), if we are to try to think in a 
manner appropriate to our own world. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy R ob-
erts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the 
Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture 
or a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world 
figure to speak on "Values of Living"-just as the late 
Chancellor proposed to do in his courses "The Human 
Situation" and "Plan for Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of 
social betterment by bringing to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecLUre was given in 1959 by Professor Everett 
C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas 
School of Law as part of his book Students' Culture ancl Perspec-
tives: Lectures on M edical and General Education. The selection 
of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been pub-
lished, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 
seventy-five cents each. 
1961. '"The Idea of Man- An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology." 
By Jose Fcrrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College. 
1962. "Changes in Events and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester. 
1963. "Moral PbiJosophy and the Analysis o£ Language." 
By Richard B. Brand t, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College. 
1964. "Human Freedom and the Sci£." 
By Roderick M. Chisholm, J>ro[essor of Philosophy, Brown University. 
1965. "Freedom of Mind." 
By Stuart H ampshire, Professor of Philosophy. Princeton University. 
1966. "Some llclic£s about Justice.'' 
By William K. Frankena, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigau. 
1967. " Fom1 and Content in Ethical T heory." 
By Wilfrid Sellars, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh. 
1968. "The Systematic Unity of Value." 
By J. N. Findlay, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. 
1969. "Buber and l.luberism- A Critical Evaluation.'' 
By Paul Edwards. Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City 
University of New York. 
1971. "What Actually Happened." 
lly P. H. Noweii ·Smith, t>rofcssor of Philosophy, York University. 
1972. "Moral Rationality." 
By Alan Gcwinh, Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago. 
